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Abstract
An emerging literature has suggested that self-relevance automatically enhances stimulus processing (i.e., the self-prioriti-
zation effect). Specifically, during shape–label matching tasks, geometric shapes associated with the self are identified more 
rapidly than comparable stimuli paired with other targets (e.g., friend, stranger). Replicating and extending work that chal-
lenges the putative automaticity of this effect, here we hypothesized that self-relevance facilitates stimulus processing only 
when task sets draw attention to previously formed shape–label associations in memory. The results of a shape-classification 
task confirmed this prediction. Compared to shapes associated with a friend, those paired with the self were classified more 
rapidly when participants were required to report who the stimulus denoted (i.e., self or friend). In contrast, self-relevance 
failed to facilitate performance when participants judged either what the shape was (i.e., triangle or square, diamond or 
circle) or where it was located on the screen (i.e., above or below fixation). These findings further elucidate the conditions 
under which self-relevance does—and does not—influence stimulus processing.
A commonly reported finding in the psychological literature 
is that self-relevance facilitates stimulus processing. Com-
pared to material associated with other people (e.g., friend, 
mother, celebrity), items linked with the self are easier to 
notice, evaluate, and remember (e.g., Bargh & Pratto, 1986; 
Keyes & Brady, 2010; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Shapiro, 
Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997; Symons & Johnson, 1997). 
Remedying a troublesome stimulus confound that under-
mined previous work on this topic (i.e., higher familiarity 
of own face/name vs. other face/name), recent research has 
demonstrated that the benefits of self-relevance extend even 
to inconsequential stimuli; notably, geometric shapes (Hum-
phreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2017). After pairing 
shapes with various person-related labels (circle = you, tri-
angle = friend, square = stranger), participants’ perceptual-
matching judgments (i.e., do shape–label stimulus pairs 
match the previously learned associations?) were fastest for 
stimuli associated with the self (vs. best friend or stranger), 
a stimulus-prioritization effect that is claimed to reflect an 
obligatory facet of social-cognitive functioning (Janczyk, 
Humphreys, & Sui, 2019; Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; 
Sui, Liu, Mevorach, & Humphreys, 2013; Sui, Liu, Wang, 
& Han, 2009; Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014). But is 
this necessarily the case?
There are at least a couple of reasons for questioning the 
alleged automaticity of self-prioritization during stimu-
lus processing. First, a problematic aspect of the standard 
shape–label matching paradigm is that, throughout the task, 
participants must monitor the self-relevance of the stimuli 
(i.e., self-relevance is made salient through the experimen-
tal instructions), otherwise perceptual matching cannot 
be performed successfully (Sui et al., 2012, 2013, 2014). 
Indeed, when this explicit task requirement is removed, 
self-prioritization is eliminated (Dalmaso, Castelli, & Gal-
fano, in press; Siebold, Weaver, Donk, & van Zoest, 2015; 
Stein, Siebold, & Zoest, 2016; Wade & Vickery, 2018). For 
example, in a rapid oculomotor search paradigm, Siebold 
et al. (2015) reported no facilitation in eye movements to 
lines previously associated with the self (vs. stranger). Simi-
larly, using breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) 
to examine the ease with which items (i.e., Gabors) access 
consciousness during a stimulus-localization task, Stein 
et al. (2016) observed no effect of self-relevance on the 
time taken for Gabors to overcome interocular suppression. 
Interestingly, however, contrasting Stein et al. (2016), Mac-
rae, Visokomogilski, Golubickis, Cunningham, and Sahraie 
(2017) demonstrated enhanced access to visual awareness 
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for self-relevant (vs. other-relevant) shapes when partici-
pants performed a stimulus-identification task. What this 
latter finding suggests is that self-prioritization is contingent 
upon task instructions (e.g., stimulus localization vs. stimu-
lus identification) that draw attention to the self-relevance 
of target-object associations in memory.
Second, albeit in a different (though related) experimen-
tal context (i.e., object ownership), Falbén et al. (2019) 
reported that self-relevance only facilitated performance 
when semantic task sets (e.g., reporting the ownership or 
identity of pencils/pens) directed attention to previously 
formed target–object associations. When emphasis switched 
instead to a perceptual appraisal of the stimuli (i.e., report-
ing the orientation of pencils/pens), self-prioritization failed 
to emerge. Likewise, when required to report which of two 
objects initially appeared on the computer screen (i.e., tem-
poral order judgment task)—a mug owned-by-self or a mug 
owned-by-the-experimenter—Constable, Welsh, Huffman, 
and Pratt (2019) revealed that participants were biased 
toward reporting that self-owned (vs. experimenter-owned) 
items were presented first. This effect was abolished, how-
ever, when the requested judgment was orthogonal to the 
dimension of interest (i.e., ownership), such that participants 
were asked to report whether a mug appeared to the left or 
right of fixation. Collectively these studies suggest that, dur-
ing stimulus processing, self-prioritization is sensitive to the 
salience of self-object associations in memory.
Of course, ownership paradigms differ in several impor-
tant respects from the shape–label matching tasks that have 
dominated work on this topic (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui 
& Gu, 2017; Sui & Humphreys, 2015, 2017), but perhaps 
most significantly in terms of the status of the stimuli on 
which judgments are rendered (Constable et al., 2019; Fal-
bén et al., 2019; Golubickis, Falbén, Cunningham, & Mac-
rae, 2018; Sui et al., 2012, 2013, 2014; Truong, Roberts, & 
Todd, 2017). Whereas in perceptual-matching tasks geomet-
ric shapes serve as proxies for various social targets (e.g., 
self is a triangle, friend is a square); in ownership tasks, in 
contrast, everyday objects are linked with the self and others 
through association (e.g., self owns pens, friend owns pen-
cils). This difference in the manner in which stimuli acquire 
self-relevance (i.e., self-surrogate vs. self-associate) may 
have important implications for the course and products of 
self-referential processing, hence the automaticity of self-
prioritization (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 
2017). Accordingly, extending previous research (Constable 
et al., 2019; Falbén et al., 2019), here we considered whether 
task sets moderate self-prioritization when participants eval-
uate stimuli (i.e., geometric shapes) that denote the self and 
a friend (Sui et al., 2012).
Even when judging geometric shapes that designate the 
self (and others), we suspect that stimulus prioritization only 
occurs when the cognitive system is configured in particular 
ways. That is, like other seemingly automatic processes, self-
prioritization is dependent on higher-order factors—includ-
ing intentions, goals, and task sets—that shape stimulus pro-
cessing and response generation (Kiefer, 2007; Memelink & 
Hommel, 2013; Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Naccache, Blan-
din, & Dehaene, 2002). In particular, whereas self-relevance 
should facilitate performance when task sets yield access to 
shape–target associations in memory (Janczyk et al., 2019; 
Sui et al., 2012, 2013, 2014); absent these specific processing 
conditions, self-prioritization is unlikely to emerge (Consta-
ble et al., 2019; Dalmaso et al., in press; Falbén et al., 2019; 
Siebold et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016). Functioning in this 
way, self-prioritization is consistent with Hommel’s (1998, 
2004, 2018) Theory of Event Coding (TEC). According to 
this account, processing episodes generate event files whereby 
elements of the experience are associated and stored in mem-
ory (e.g., self-is-a-square). Crucially, re-experiencing any of 
these stimuli (e.g., a square) at a later date can trigger partial 
or complete retrieval of the event file (e.g., the self-square 
association), thereby impacting task performance to varying 
degrees. In this way, the TEC provides a useful framework 
for understanding the generation of self-prioritization effects 
during stimulus processing (Hommel, 2004, 2018).
In a shape-classification task, here we considered how 
task sets impact self-prioritization (Constable et al., 2019; 
Falbén et al., 2019). Participants first associated geometric 
shapes (e.g., square, triangle) with either the self or a best 
friend (Sui et al., 2012). Next, to explore the automaticity 
of self-prioritization, they completed three blocks of trials 
in a computer-based shape-classification task, with each 
block requiring a different judgment to be undertaken on the 
stimuli. Specifically, participants reported: (i) to whom the 
shapes referred (‘who’ task); (ii) the identity of the shapes 
(‘what’ task); and (iii) whether the shapes appeared above 
or below the fixation cross on the screen (‘where’ task). In 
so doing, by probing different aspects of the stimuli (i.e., 
social status vs. physical status vs. perceptual status), the 
current experiment comprised a conceptual replication and 
extension of Falbén et al. (2019), in that the targets of judg-
ment on this occasion were geometric shapes that served as 
proxies for the self and best friend (cf. self-owned vs. friend-
owned objects). We expected self-prioritization to be mod-
erated by the extent to which task sets access target–shape 
associations in memory during stimulus processing (Hom-





Eighty undergraduates (14 males, Mage = 20.67, SD = 3.06) 
took part in the research.1 All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Five participants (1 male) 
were excluded from the statistical analysis for failing to fol-
low the experimental instructions. Informed consent was 
obtained from participants prior to the commencement of the 
experiment and the protocol was reviewed and approved by 
the Ethics Committee at the School of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Aberdeen. The experiment had a 3 (Judgment: who 
vs. what vs. where) × 2 (Target: self vs. friend) × 2 (Shapes: 
triangle & square vs. diamond & circle) mixed design with 
repeated measures on the first two factors.
Stimulus materials and procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory individually, were 
greeted by an experimenter, seated in front of a desktop 
computer, and told they would be performing a shape-clas-
sification task. Following Sui et al. (2012), the experiment 
had two phases. The first phase comprised a learning task 
in which participants were required to associate geometric 
shapes with the self and a best friend. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the shape conditions. For half of 
the participants, the shapes were a triangle and a square; for 
the others they were a diamond and a circle. Two categories 
of shapes were used to provide a between-participants rep-
lication of the experiment. The shapes were not presented 
at this stage and shape–target associations and shape–target 
order were counterbalanced across the sample during the 
learning task.
Next, participants were informed they would be perform-
ing a shape-classification task. The task comprised three 
blocks of trials, with a different stimulus-related judgment 
required in each block. In one block (i.e., ‘who’ judgment), 
participants reported whether the shape presented on the 
screen represented them or their friend. In another block 
(i.e., ‘what ’judgment), whether the shape was a triangle or 
a square (diamond or circle). In a final block (i.e., ‘where’ 
judgment), whether the shape was displayed above or below 
the fixation cross on the screen. In all blocks, half of the 
items appeared above and half below the fixation cross and 
the order of the judgment tasks was counterbalanced across 
the sample. Before the start of each block, the experimenter 
explained that participants would be presented with a series 
of shapes and their task was simply to categorize each shape 
(via a button press), as quickly and accurately as possible, 
according to the specific judgment task. Responses were 
given using two buttons on the keyboard (i.e., N & M). Key-
response mappings were counterbalanced across participants 
and across judgment tasks.
Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixa-
tion cross for 500 ms, followed by the image of a shape for 
100 ms. After each shape was presented, the screen turned 
blank and participants had 1100 ms in which to respond (Sui 
et al., 2012). Following each response, the fixation cross 
reappeared and the next trial commenced. The images of 
the shapes were 214 × 214 pixels in size. Participants ini-
tially performed 8 practice trials for each type of judgment, 
followed by a block of 196 experimental trials in which 
stimuli occurred equally often in a random order. In total, 
there were 588 trials, with 196 trials in each block (i.e., judg-
ment task), and 98 trials in each condition (i.e., 98 self-trials 
& 98-friend-trials). On completion of the task, participants 
were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Results and discussion
Responses faster than 200 ms were excluded from the analy-
sis, eliminating less than 1% of the overall number of trials 
(see Table 1 for treatment means). A multilevel model was 
used to examine the response time (RT) and accuracy data. 
Analyses were conducted with the R package ‘lmer4’ (Pin-
heiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2015), with 
participants as a crossed random effect (Judd, Westfall, & 
Kenny, 2012). Analysis of the RTs yielded main effects of 
Judgment (b = 0.376, SE = 0.621, t  = 60.49, p < 0.001) and 
Target (b = − 1.519, SE = 0.504, t = − 3.01, p = 0.003), and 
a significant Judgment × Target interaction (b = − 1.635, 
SE = 0.619, t = − 2.64, p = 0.008). Further analysis of 
the interaction revealed that, for ‘who’ judgments, RTs 
were faster for shapes that denoted the self than shapes 
that denoted a friend (b = − 3.465, SE = 0.906, t = − 3.83, 
p < 0.001). No such self-prioritization effect emerged on 
either ‘what’ (b = − 0.515, SE = 0.866, t = − 0.59, p = 0.552) 
Table 1  Mean reaction time (RT) and accuracy (%) as a function of 
Judgment and Target
Standard deviations appear within parentheses
Judgment Target Mean RT (ms) Accuracy (%)
Who Self 408 (121) 89 (31)
Friend 413 (121) 90 (30)
What Self 407 (120) 92 (28)
Friend 409 (120) 93 (26)
Where Self 341(97) 97 (18)
Friend 341 (95) 96 (19)
1 Sample size was based on Falbén et al. (2019).
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or ‘where’ (b = − 0.311, SE = 0.717, t = − 0.43, p = 0.665) 
judgments.2
A multilevel logistic regression analysis on the accuracy 
of responses yielded main effects of Judgment (b = − 0.573, 
SE = 0.025, z = − 22.90, p < 0.001) and Target (b = − 0.41, 
SE = 0.020, z = − 2.02, p = 0.044). The Judgment X Tar-
get interaction, however, was not significant (b = − 0.013, 
SE = 0.025, z = 0.53, p = 0.594).
These results confirm that, across different pairs of 
shapes, self-prioritization is dependent on the task set that 
is operating during stimulus processing (Constable et al., 
2019; Dalmaso et al., in press; Falbén et al., 2019; Siebold 
et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016). Whereas self-prioritization 
was observed when judgments pertained to the target (i.e., 
‘who’ judgment) with whom geometric shapes had previ-
ously been associated, no such effect emerged when they 
probed either the identity (i.e., ‘what’ judgment) or location 
(i.e., ‘where’ judgment) of the shapes. Moreover, the compa-
rable RTs in the ‘who’ and ‘what’ (vs. ‘where’) tasks reveal 
that self-prioritization was not a function of task difficulty—
stimulus prioritization only occurred when self-relevance 
was an explicit component of the task set (Siebold et al., 
2015; Stein et al., 2016).
Discussion
An extensive literature has demonstrated the benefits of self-
relevance on stimulus processing (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; 
Sui & Humphreys, 2015). Using a perceptual-matching task, 
researchers have shown that participants make faster and 
less errant responses to stimuli related to the self than other 
persons. Critically, this effect has been replicated on numer-
ous occasions, with self-prioritization extending to a wide 
range of stimuli, including: geometric shapes (Desebrock, 
Sui, & Spence, 2018; Enock, Sui, Hewstone, & Humphreys, 
2018; Golubickis et al., 2017; Schäfer, Frings, & Wentura, 
2016; Schäfer, Wentura, & Frings, 2017; Schäfer, Wesslein, 
Spence, Wenura, & Frings, 2016; Sui et al., 2012, 2013, 
2014), badges of sports teams (Moradi, Sui, Hewstone, & 
Humphreys, 2015), objects (Schäfer, Wentura, & Frings, 
2015), computer-generated avatars (Mattan, Quinn, Apperly, 
Sui, & Rothshtein, 2015), Gabor patches (Macrae, Visoko-
mogilski, Golubickis, & Sahraie, 2018; Stein et al., 2016), 
lines (Siebold et al., 2015), and faces (Payne, Tsakiris, & 
Maister, 2017). In addition, self-prioritization has been 
reported across various sensory modalities (Frings & Wen-
tura, 2014; Schäfer et al., 2015, 2016b).
Notwithstanding multiple demonstrations of self-prior-
itization during stimulus processing, lingering questions 
remain regarding the status of this effect. Based largely on 
studies using perceptual-matching tasks, conventional wis-
dom asserts that the mind is intricately tuned to personally 
meaningful material, such that self-relevance automatically 
enhances stimulus processing via bottom-up attentional 
capture (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015; 
Sui & Rotshtein, 2019). Beyond shape–label matching tasks, 
however, the advantages of self-relevance appear to be far 
from obligatory. Across a range of paradigms and measures 
(e.g., oculomotor search, b-CFS, temporal order judgments, 
object categorization), self-relevance has been shown to 
exert little influence on task performance (e.g., Constable 
et al., 2019; Dalmaso et al., in press; Falbén et al., 2019; Sie-
bold et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2016; Wade & Vickery, 2018), 
prompting Siebold et al. (2015, p. 1014) to conclude that “…
the occurrence of the self-prioritization effect is specific to 
the requirements of the matching paradigm.” Echoing these 
sentiments, here we demonstrated the conditional automatic-
ity of self-prioritization during a shape-classification task.
Replicating prior research, self-prioritization was contin-
gent upon the task set (i.e., ‘who’ vs. ‘what’ vs. ‘where’) that 
was operating during stimulus evaluation (Constable et al., 
2019; Dalmaso et al., in press; Falbén et al., 2019).3 Impor-
tantly, however, the current results diverged from Falbén et al. 
(2019) in an interesting way. Using an object-ownership task, 
Falbén et al. (2019) revealed that self-relevance facilitated per-
formance when task sets probed either the ownership or physi-
cal identity of the stimuli (i.e., ‘who’ and ‘what’ tasks). When 
emphasis switched instead to a perceptual analysis of the 
objects (i.e., ‘where’ task), self-relevance had no influence on 
performance, thereby implying that self-prioritization requires 
the operation of semantic task sets. Here, in contrast, self-pri-
oritization failed to materialize under a comparable seman-
tic processing objective (i.e., ‘what’ is the shape?), emerging 
instead only when self-relevance was an overt aspect of the 
requested judgment (i.e., ‘who’ is the shape?). This difference 
highlights the task-related dependency of self-prioritization. 
3 The absence of a self-prioritization effect when judging the loca-
tion of the stimuli could due to a floor effect in RTs (but see Falbén 
et al., 2019). Of greater theoretical interest, however, was the failure 
of the two semantic task sets to elicit comparable effects, despite RTs 
that were equivalent.
2 To explore the possibility that task order influenced self-pri-
oritization, we conducted an additional analysis of the RTs in 
which this repeated-measures factor was added to the multi-
level model. The only additional effects to emerge in this analy-
sis were a main effect of Order (b = − 6.420,  SE = 0.636,  t = − 
10.10,  p < 0.001) and a significant Order × Judgment interac-
tion  (b = − 6.889,  SE = 1.083,  t = − 6.36,  p < 0.001). Further inspec-
tion of the interaction revealed an effect of Order on ‘who’ judgments 
(b = − 20.779,  SE = 8.335,  t = − 2.49,  p = 0.015), such that responses 
(to both self and friend) were fastest (M = 393, SD = 115) when this 
task was performed third (vs. second   [M = 419, SD = 122] or first 




Given the pivotal (and natural) role that proprietorship plays 
in everyday life (Beggan, 1992; Belk, 1988; 2014; James, 
1890), ownership likely forges potent self-object connec-
tions in memory that can be accessed via multiple semantic 
pathways (Hommel, 2004). In contrast, the methodologically 
expedient—though somewhat artificial—activity of associat-
ing shapes with social targets is unlikely to create associations 
that can be reactivated in this way (Siebold et al., 2015; Stein 
et al., 2016), hence task sets must emphasize self-relevance 
to elicit stimulus prioritization. Thus, depending on the task 
context and the judgmental requirements, whether stimuli are 
self-surrogates or self-associates is an important determinant 
of prioritized processing.
Together with related research, the current findings under-
score the malleability of self-prioritization (Constable et al., 
2019; Dalmaso et al., in press; Falbén et al., 2019; Siebold 
et  al., 2015; Stein et  al., 2016; Wade & Vickery, 2018). 
Far from depicting a mandatory effect, the benefits of self-
relevance appear sensitive to how stimuli are encountered, 
encoded, and evaluated (Bargh, 1989; Hommel, 2004, 2018; 
Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Of particular importance is the 
manner in which self-relevance is established. This, of course, 
would be expected if one assumes that self-referential pro-
cessing guides behavior in a flexible way (e.g., Baars, 1988; 
Baumeister, 1998; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Heath-
erton, 2011; Neisser, 1988). If every potentially self-relevant 
stimulus was prioritized during processing, social-cognitive 
functioning would rapidly grind to halt. For example, absent 
the objective of driving into town, one’s car has no immedi-
ate applicability (i.e., goal-relevance). It would therefore be 
somewhat cumbrous if the mind was to prioritize this currently 
insignificant stimulus based only on its possible self-relevance. 
Under attentional control, self-relevance can guide cognition in 
a strategic, adaptive manner (Hommel, 2004, 2018).
The contextual flexibility that daily functioning demands 
may be provided by an intentional weighting mechanism 
that, prior to task performance (e.g., ‘who’ vs. ‘where’ tasks), 
increases the output gain on task-relevant features of the event 
file (i.e., target-object associations) in memory. In other words, 
depending on the task at hand, the same event file may be cog-
nitively coded (i.e., weighted) in quite different ways, thereby 
producing quite different effects (see Memelink & Hommel, 
2013). What is needed, therefore, are studies that tap the pri-
oritization (or otherwise) of stimuli in task contexts that cap-
ture life outside the laboratory. Specifically, research must go 
beyond the explicit appraisal of inconsequential (though self-
relevant) shapes to consider exactly when, how, and for whom 
different types of material are prioritized during stimulus pro-
cessing (Golubickis et al., in press). In so doing, work of this 
kind will explicate the conditions under which self-relevance 
does—and indeed does not—facilitate thinking and doing.
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